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
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# *Review of* **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

VOL. 1, NUMBER 8

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## INQUIRY ON PEACE:

CPYRGH  
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Struggle for Peace Through Struggle for Equality  
of Peoples (Dr. Sinisha Stankovich)

The USSR Attitude to the UNO (K. Borich)

Defenders of Soviet Bureaucratic Caste and the Most Important  
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Belgian Cominformists Fear Spread of »Titoism«

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Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj on Yugoslavia's Attitude Toward the Korean War

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EDITORS: DUSHAN TIMOTIYEVICH AND ZDRAVKO PECHAR

# Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THIS MAGAZINE IS A FREE TRIBUNE  
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## FIREMEN



(Jež — Beograd)

# *Review of* **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

### THE KOREAN ISSUE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE Security Council's work during August is characterized by complete failure to settle the Korean issue. Heated discussions on questions of procedure which went on for a whole month were interrupted only once by an attempt to make a move toward settling the Korean problem. Namely the Indian delegate Benegal Rau suggested that the Security Council form a commission of the six non-permanent members which would examine all proposals made to solve the conflict in Korea and would draw up a draft statutes for the future united Korea. This suggestion, however, never took the form of a concrete proposal since neither of the two powers most directly involved, the USA and the USSR, gave it their support.

This once again bears the contention that the struggle between two rival blocs forms the foundation of the Korean conflict. The aspirations of the Korean people for freedom, independence and democratic rights only serve as a means for one or the other big power to achieve hegemony.

It should not be amiss to note that in all his lengthy speeches the Soviet delegate Jacob Malik did not consider it worth while even to mention the suggestion of the Indian delegate. For his object in returning to the Security Council was not the one of seeking a way to settle the conflict in Korea, except to settle the conditions. And since this was evidently impossible, he limited his activities to obstructing the work of the Council.

The fact that the protraction of the war in Korea only augments the menace to peace in the world, and inflicts new devastation and misery upon the Korean people, drawing them further and further away from the goal to which they aspire, shows quite clearly that the Soviet policy is not inspired by a desire for peace or by the interests of the Korean people, but by quite different aims, alien both to peace and to the interests of the Korean people.

On the other hand the statement of the American delegate Warren Austin to the effect that India's proposal are unrealizable until the situation on the military front changes in favour of South Korea, could imply nothing else but a similar intention to get to a solution of the Korean Problem which would suit the intentions of USA.

And while the war is weighing more and more heavily on the Korean people and world peace, war-mongering circles both in the West and East are making most of the present atmosphere to speed up their preparations for war, to start new manoeuvres aimed at sharpening all the contradictions and spreading the war to new areas and new peoples. In the meantime, a month in the struggle to achieve peace has been irretrievably lost.

The Yugoslav delegation in the Security Council supported the Indian delegate's initiative, considering that it offered a way out of the present deadlock in the Security Council and an approach to the solution

of the Korean issue other than along lines of interests of either bloc but rather in behalf of world peace and of the interests of the Korean people. Yugoslavia's position from the very outbreak of hostilities in Korea was thus once again confirmed. Yugoslavia, realizing that the aspirations of the Korean people for unity, independence and freedom are fully justified, rejects aggression and holds the war in Korea to be a menace to world peace. Accordingly, the efforts of the Yugoslav delegation have been aimed at halting the military operations and removing the danger of spreading the war so as to preserve world peace, on the one hand, and on other, to help the Korean people, through mediation, to realize their genuine liberation and independence outside of any sphere of interest. The recent statement made by the Yugoslav foreign minister E. Kardelj has further confirmed this position, which will be undoubtedly again elaborated at the sessions of the General Assembly.

#### Crime of Genocide in Bulgaria

DURING by all evidence, it seems that the present Bulgarian leaders do not consider themselves under obligation to respect the code of the UNO Charter and to act accordingly, presumably because Bulgaria is not a member of the United

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

Nations Organization. Inclining to that conception, and viewing human rights in this light, they do not hesitate to commit such an offence as the crime of genocide. Therefore today they are committing acts within their country which can only be characterized as genocide, especially in relation to members of the Yugoslav National Minority in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian citizens in the border areas who fall under the slightest suspicion that they disagree with the policy of the leaders, the policy which has reduced Bulgaria to the status of an ordinary Soviet province.

At the present time the Bulgarian Cominform authorities are carrying out mass deportations. Members of the Yugoslav minority along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border are being deported in masses to the interior. This action is primarily aimed against the population of Pyrean Macedonia, which for almost two years and a half has been subjected to the most brutal terror of the Bulgarian cominformists. At present the Bulgarian police of that province are dragging entire families to unknown destinations. The deportation is carried out in a very brutal way, indicating the source of experience of the Bulgarian police in the drastic measures against innocent people. This is a combination of the methods used by German fascists the allies of Coburg Bulgaria during the second world war, against peoples of the pillaged lands of Europe, and the practice the present Bulgarian allies, the Soviet leaders, employed against certain Crimean and Caucasian peoples. During nights the Bulgarian police herd dozens of Macedonian families into trucks, giving them only an hour or two to get ready and compelling them to leave their belonging behind except some clothing and food. That is repeated night after night.

These measures of the Bulgarian authorities represent a part of the Soviet-Cominform plans for the Balkans. This is intended to create a war psychology among the Bulgarian masses to whom it is explained that these measures are being undertaken because of danger of attack by Yugoslavia. In this way the feel-

ing of uncertainty and anxiety is aroused among the Bulgarian people, and to arouse chauvinist passions. All in all, a greater abyss is being accentuated between the peoples of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and that, in the extreme instance, exactly corresponds to the Soviet hegemonistic aspirations in this part of the World. Consequently the USSR leaders have a direct interest in this action.

The motives which have moved the Bulgarian cominformists to carry out this crime, aside from the Soviet command, are of another nature. The Bulgarian leaders, obeying the cominform policy, are compelled to base their whole anti-Yugoslav policy on falsehoods. The presence of the Yugoslav minority and of honest men in general, on the border, especially of owners of land across the border, who were able to find out the truth, to see that everything is peaceful in Yugoslavia, that there are no military preparations against no one, including Bulgaria, was under no circumstances desirable to the Bulgarian cominformists, and so they undertook measures to remove the witnesses who could confute their lies — using methods which correspond to their moral qualities of betrayers of the interests of their own people.

### Purges in the United Socialist Party of Germany

ANYONE who follows the daily press or radio can easily see that things are far from being in order in the internal political life of Soviet East Germany. There is hardly a day without news about the flight of some state official or public figure to the West. Even more frequent are stories about the removal and arrest of functionaries of the United Socialist Party of Germany. These have become more common recently since the general purge, directed from Moscow, has broadened in scope.

Not long ago, the leaders of that Party hinted that it would be necessary to purge it of "undesirable elements", mostly "Titoists". According to Walter Uhlbricht, General

Secretary of the Party and the most trusted Soviet man in Eastern Germany, these people are mostly former prisoners of war who returned from Yugoslavia.

Contrary to what Mr. Uhlbricht says, however, the majority of them are not former prisoners of war, or rather, they are not the only ones offering resistance to the anti-Germany policy of the United Socialist Party, namely its policy of complete subordination of Eastern Germany to the USSR and the German working class movement to the temporary interests of Soviet diplomacy. Testimony of this is the list of names of distinguished East German state and party officials who were recently removed from their positions, expelled from the Party and finally arrested. The people involved here are well — known personalities and Party workers from the ranks of the Party.

A recent communique from the Party newspaper, "Neues Deutschland", says that the following were expelled from the Party and taken into custody: Paul Mercker, former member of the Politburo of the German Communist Party and former Minister of Agriculture in the Soviet occupation zone; Leo Bauer, former editor of the Soviet Radio Berlin, who succeeded in escaping to Western Germany; Bruno Goldhamer, former chief of the Eastern German Office of Information; Willi Kreikmayer, former director of the State Railways Administration, Leo Endor, former editor of "Neues Deutschland"; and the prominent party worker Marta Veiterer.

The purge is at its peak now and has spread to almost all organizations of the United German Socialist Party. In Magdeburg and Halle alone, over 250 members have been expelled so far. As regards the removal from posts, arrest and escape to the Western zone of officials of the other political parties, they have become common, every day occurrence in the life of Eastern Germany. Simply enumerating the names and functions of these people would take up entire columns.

As far as the purge of members of the United German Socialist Party are concerned, these are not cases

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of a group of people who are alien to the working class movement. Most of them are genuine representatives of the workers and people of Eastern Germany. These truly progressive people, expressing their disagreement with the transformation of the Party into an agency of the Soviet Communist Party and Eastern Germany into a province of the USSR, are simultaneously protesting against the subordination of the entire German working class movement to the Soviet policy of hegemony. From the above it is clear that even the slightest expression of disagreement with this policy in Eastern Germany means strict punishment and not only removal from public life but often from actual life as well.

### Two Characteristic Features of Italian Economy

**I**N Italian economy two characteristics are evident: on the one hand the closing down of unprofitable industrial enterprises, which were established as a result of the policy of the previous autarchial fascist regime and supported by it to the disadvantage of the wide masses of people through ample public credits and subsidies from the government budget during the entire period of their existence; and on the other the increasing number of enterprises falling under growing control of large American monopolies through import of capital. The closing down of enterprises is facilitating and speeding the process of penetration of foreign capital, which, however, is enveloping only enterprises and branches of industry which are of special interest to it and are likened with the interests of the USA foreign policy. Thus the deflation policy of the Italian Government while easing and facilitating the penetration of foreign capital, is at the same time sharpening the inner contradictions of the economy manifested in the growth of unemployment in the first place.

Unemployment in Italy is a permanent feature. There are over 2 millions totally unemployed com-

prising 10—12% of the working population. This is heightened by over 2 millions of the agrarian laborers who work annually 100 to 150 days, which means they are unemployed 3/4—3/5 of the time. Such large unemployment, coupled with low wages results in very low purchasing power i. e. an undeveloped inner market. Even so the main taxation burden is not evident in direct taxes (which are unusually low in Italy), but in indirect ones, i. e. those that burden the widest masses of peoples. This taxation policy of the Italian Government, aimed to collect funds for special investments to relieve unemployment, diminishes still further the buying power of the wide masses of peoples. Such was the case when prices of the greater part of government monopolised articles (tobacco, matches etc.) were increased, when the increase of business taxes on a series of articles (sugar etc.) was carried out, while the decrease of taxes on factory products primarily effected products consumed by the richer city classes (benzine, oils, alcohol, beer etc.). This resulted in a further rise in retail prices, further lowering of real wages and a decline in the standard of living.

The problem of permanent unemployment remains unsolved, and without any prospect of solution under prevailing circumstances. The agrarian reform and unemployment represent now the two central problems of Italian economy, the solution of which must presupposes such measures as would contribute to the raising of the purchasing power of the wide masses of peoples, and the broadening of the internal market. The narrowness of this market, and the low purchasing power, is best illustrated by the fact that the national income, less taxes, was approximately about 110.000 liras per person in 1948, which means less than 10.000 liras monthly. If this income is reckoned according to the index of retail prices in May of this year, when prices were 56.88 times higher than the prices of 1938, it shows that the present income per person is less than 170 liras monthly. This, together with other factors explains the great interest of foreign capital for Italian enterprises.

### A French Proposal

**R**ECENTLY the French Government took the initiative to amend the organization of supervision over prisoner-of-war camps in future wars. The experience of prisoners-of-war as revealed by investigations made by the supervising authorities of the camps conducted by the Swiss Red Cross in its capacity as international representative, seems to have been pretty bad. This moved the French Government to take the initiative to amend the Geneva Convention of 1949 on prisoners-of-war to the effect that an international committee should be formed made of up 24 persons of different nationalities. They would have the right to visit all prisoner-of-war camps, to maintain direct contact with the prisoners-of-war and with representatives of the belligerent states to whom the prisoners belong. The recommendation are based on the conviction that this amendment would improve the humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war.

It is interesting to note that this proposal of the French Government was supported by all those European countries which had been under occupation and those dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations whose soldiers had been in the Swiss supervised prisoner-of-war camps. The Swiss Government considered the proposal as an insult and requested the French Government to withdraw it because it contained a criticism of the Swiss Red Cross as an international committee.

This same criticism of the Swiss Red Cross was also made by the Yugoslav Red Cross Society, in very sharp form, at the General Assembly of the Red Cross Society in 1946, when the irresponsible attitude of Swiss delegations toward German camp commanders was brought up. The French proposal is therefore one more recognition of the Validity and sincerity of Yugoslav criticism aimed at increasing international cooperation.

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## "Izvestia" on the Industrialisation of East European Countries

THE Soviet newspaper "Izvestia" in its issue of August 22, published an article entitled "Strengthening of the State Order in the Countries of People's Democracy". Besides the usual phrases, the article also contained the statement that the "countries of people's democracy have liquidated their economic backwardness and started along the course of industrialization".

This statement can be contested from several viewpoints but in the first place from that of logic. How is it possible even to speak of the liquidation of economic backwardness (such as, for example, in Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, etc) when a country has only started along the course of industrialization. Because what object can the industrialization of economically and technically backward countries have, if not the liquidation of that backwardness. Thus if an under-developed country enters upon the path of industrialization it does not mean that it has thereby removed its economic and technical backwardness. Furthermore the practice of the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and those countries proves exactly the contrary. Those countries instead of progressing along the road of industrialization and developing the material basis of socialism, are forced, under the pressure of the Soviet Union, to develop their agricultural and raw material resources, and thus to remain under-developed in relation to the economy of the USSR.

Finally, the statement of "Izvestia" would imply that the liquidation of economic backwardness is the pre-condition for a country to undertake industrialization. Logic, however, and the laws of economy, show exactly the contrary to be true, namely that industrialization is the pre-condition for the liquidation of economic backwardness. That also is the logical meaning of the tasks laid down by the economic plans of the East European countries. All these plans set down as the main

lever in attaining their objective—the liquidation of economic and technical backwardness and the improvement of the population's living standard.

Accordingly, what we have here are two kinds of logic: one, the logic of the plans of the East European countries, and the other, the inverted logic of the Soviet leaders. The meaning of the latter inverted logic is the consequence of the subjugation of these countries by the Soviet Union. Namely, the Soviet leaders seek to convince the peoples of the East European states that they have overcome the technical backwardness of their countries and need therefore not build up their industries. It is enough to know only a little about the present attitude of the USSR to the East European countries to be able to understand immediately that the tale about the liquidation of the economic backwardness of these states under the USSR's control conceals the Soviet desire for an exploitation of those countries that would be as complete and easy as possible.

## The Austrian Treaty and the Interests of the Big Powers

AS was generally expected, the 257th meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the four big powers, held September 7th in London, brought no results nor did it introduce anything new into the question of the peace treaty with Austria.

Immediately after the session began the Soviet delegate brought up a question that had already been settled, namely Article 9 of the Austrian Treaty concerning denazification and demilitarization of Austria. The needless bringing up of this already solved question enabled the Soviet delegate to present his country's position toward the Austrian treaty and in general toward the problems of Central Europe, a position which reflects Soviet hegemonistic tendencies in that part of the world. Soviet delegate Zarubin again artificial-

ly linked the Austrian Treaty with the problem of Trieste. He repeated what the Soviet notes had already said twice to the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France on April 20th and July 9th. He said that "the Soviet Government is worried about the non-fulfillment of international obligations in regard to Trieste by the Western allies". Thus he tried to connect two entirely separate problems with the obvious intention of having both left unsolved or having their solution prolonged indefinitely.

It is easy to comprehend the stand of the Soviet representative. His government wants to make it impossible to solve the Trieste problem by way of direct negotiations between the interested parties — Yugoslavia and Italy, and to confine the solution of this problem to the four big powers.

The direct reasons governing the USSR in its delaying tactics in regard to concluding the peace treaty with Austria are many. There are two which stand out: the first relates to Austria, where Soviet occupation troops are stationed and the second to countries through which they must pass. In both cases, the Soviet Government considers that the presence of its Army is a guarantee of successful implementation of its hegemonistic policy in that part of the world.

Judging from the conduct and the termination of this meeting, it can be concluded that the Western Powers also are not very much concerned about the conclusion of the Austrian Peace Treaty. Their representatives readily agreed to end the discussions and did not object to the British proposal to have the next session held in the mid December. In any case, the interests of both sides, although opposed in essence, have many points in common.

One thing is clear: that obstructions and the delays in the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Austria are in no way in accord with the slogans about peace which are being heard both in the East and in the West.

## INQUIRY ON PEACE

# STRUGGLE FOR PEACE THROUGH STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY OF PEOPLES

by dr. Sinisha STANKOVICH

THE question of peace, which is become more and more urgent in the minds of millions of men of good will in the world, is in essence a question of relations among the various people and states, and the development of those relations in the post-war period. Although the termination of the recent bloody drama brought with it tremendous changes in the political picture of the world and in the relationship of political forces through the military defeat of the three aggressive fascist states and the appearance of a number of socialist countries, it did not destroy the reasons which give rise to aggressive and hegemonistic tendencies in the world. During the past five years, we have been witnesses to the revival of expansionist tendencies and pretensions to world domination, especially in the big business circles of the USA. Judging from their motives and their content, the post-war aspirations toward world rule are not a bit different from those which the recent fascist aggressors tried to realize at the price of a devastating war. They are accompanied, although in a different form, by analagous phenomena: struggle for monopoly on the world markets; placing the war-weakened countries, especially the smaller ones, in a position of increasing political-economic dependence and reducing them to the position of servile satellites; the suffocation of progressive democratic movements in the dependant and semi-dependant states and support of the remnants of backward, pro-fascist forces, especially in the former enemy states; increased armaments; the establishment of military bases and the securing of strategic position in various parts of the world; the organization of military blocks and drawing a whole group of states into the service of the more or less concealed expansionist policies. The picture of the present international relations does not in the least correspond to the spirit of the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and even less to the desires of millions of working people throughout the world whose great

sacrifices and bloody efforts made possible the victory over the fascist conquerors.

It is becoming all too clear to any objective observer that the present international relations are not contributing to the maintenance of peace. They are far from resting on the basic principle of genuine peace, namely, on respect for the independence and equality of various peoples, both large and small. By that token, they do not differ greatly from the pre-war international relations. But the present international situation is outstanding for one other factor which it was hard to foresee at the end of the war, and that is the creation and maintenance of unequal relations among countries that have taken the road to building of socialism. This became clear to the broad public from the moment the well-known dispute broke out between the largest socialist country, the USSR, and socialist Yugoslavia. It was shown that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, as it is being pursued in relation to certain East European countries, is unsocialist and unjust in essence, for it subordinates the entire economic and political development of those countries to its own interests as a state and big power. This puts all those countries in an unequal and dependent position. Gradually they are losing their national sovereignty and inevitably becoming mere satellites of the big power holding them in subjection. The exception to this is Yugoslavia which gave determined resistance to the attempt at placing it in such unenviable position.

All the consequences of the foreign policy of the Soviet leaders not only for the development of socialism and the progressive working class movement in the world, but also for the cause of peace, cannot be foreseen. Dividing up the world into the "West" and the "East", into two blocks of countries, one capitalist, directed by the American imperialists, and one socialist led by USSR, the Soviet Union is unavoidably turning to the backward road of struggle for mastery in the world, a road of spheres of interest and in the final analysis the road of hegemonistic competition with other big powers. A



## INQUIRY ON PEACE

whole series of facts demonstrate eloquently how much the foreign policy of the leaders of the first socialist country has deviated from socialist positions and been transformed into a big power policy. Among the most outstanding is the terrific economic and political pressure and blockade against a small socialist country like Yugoslavia.

That is how it came about that the present international situation is dominated by the policy of spheres of interest of two big powers, each one of whom is trying to secure its own particular interests by way of creating separate blocs of subordinate countries and satellites. Each of them is in one way or another threatening the independence of countries in its own bloc, especially the small ones, interfering in their internal affairs, subordinating their economies to its purposes, and determining the direction of their internal and foreign policies, thus obstructing their free development.

It is altogether clear that inherent in such a policy of spheres of interests and unequal relations is a serious danger to peace in general. This is illustrated not only by the "cold war" which is being carried on in the most varied forms and with different kinds of means, but creation of a war psychosis, and even local wars such as the one in Korea. The victim there is the Korean people who sincerely wish their own independence and free life.

Is such a situation, the toiling masses of the whole world and all men of good will who sincerely want peace see clearly that the support of a policy of spheres of interest and division of the world into rival bloc is not and cannot be the road to securing peace. Such a road can be laid only through persistent struggle for the realization of the fundamental preconditions for real peace, meaning the establishment of equal relations among peoples and countries, regardless of their size or the ideological bases on which their internal order rests. History unequivocally shows that fruitful international cooperation is possible only on the basis of full freedom and the independence of various peoples, for only free and equal peoples can make permanent ties and grow closer together for the purpose of extensive peaceful cooperation.

That the struggle for freedom and independence, for full equality in international relations, is an expression of the unconquerable will of all peoples in the world is demonstrated by the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Their aspirations toward, and realization of, national liberty and sovereignty could not be broken by any of the conquerors who oppressed them temporarily, over centuries of time. These wishes have been fulfilled in their entirety in socialist Yugoslavia which is really a community of free and equal peoples. Therein lies the internal strength of Yugoslavia and thence its sincere desire for true peace on the basis of equal international relations.

The policy of spheres of interest and blocs which threatens world peace inevitably provokes resistance from the masses of people throughout the world and the growth of forces striving for peace. The conviction is justified that the masses of the people, who withstood the impact of the invaders during the last war, will succeed in rendering impossible the aggressive and hegemonistic aspirations of those circles implementing such a policy.



M. NIKOLAYEVICH: HARVEST

## THE USSR'S ATTITUDE TO THE UNO

THE Soviet representative's return to the Security Council after almost seven months' boycott of the UNO bodies by the USSR evoked wide comment. It elicited many surmises concerning the motives of this latest Soviet step concerning the aims and intentions of the USSR's policy, especially with respect to the UNO. In order to give a correct appraisal of these Soviet acts it is necessary to examine certain facts which can shed light on this latest "volte-face" in the USSR's foreign policy.

What have the Soviet representatives to say about this? When on January 13th 1950, the Soviet delegate Jacob Malik walked out of the Security Council, he declared he was doing so because of the presence of the Kuomintang delegate with whom he would "not sit at the same table". The other Soviet representatives giving the same reason, subsequently left the different UNO bodies one after the other, so that the boycott of the United Nations by the USSR was complete after a short time. The Soviet official propaganda and the Cominform idolizers of the Soviet policy hailed this gesture — which to say the least was most unfriendly as regards the UNO and the principles of international cooperation upon which this organization rests, and which for this very reason was not and could not be in the interest of peace and security in the world — as a "new" proof of the Soviet peace-loving policy, "aimed at strengthening peace and international cooperation in the world".

After somewhat over six months since its decision to boycott the UNO, the Soviet Government abruptly decided to instruct its representative to return to the Security Council and once more take the seat he had vacated. This was again accompanied by the same chorus: the return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council is another proof of the peace-loving policy of the USSR.

Thus, the interests of peace in the world, in one case required the USSR to boycott the UNO bodies, and in the other to return to them. First we were told that the attitude of the USSR was "a deeply principled one" because the Soviet representative cannot sit at the same table with a representative of the Kuomintang clique, while now we are told that the USSR had to sacrifice its "deeply principled attitude" to the "interests of maintaining peace and security in the world".

What actually lies concealed behind these high-sounding phrases about peace and international cooperation? There is no doubt that in the interest of international peace the UNO should remain a universal international organization, because only thus can it truly discharge the role which has been entrusted it — that of being an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security in the world. But if it is to attain its objective, all its members must strive to realize its lofty goal and to show, not only in words but in deeds as well, that they honour the principles upon which it rests and that they are genuinely working towards the fulfilment of the aims for which it has been created. That is why it is necessary to analyse the motives of the acts of its members, because only in this way shall we be in a position to judge whether their words conform to their deeds and to the real aims of their policy.

Was the real reason of the USSR's decision to boycott the UNO the fact that the western powers denied the Chinese people the right to be represented in the UNO? If words were in keeping with the

acts and real aims of the Soviet policy, this would in fact be true. However, the motives of this Soviet act were obviously quite different, the USSR was not concerned in the least about the interests of New China and the Chinese people.

When the USSR began its boycott of the Security Council and of other UNO bodies, all opinions to the effect that this boycott would not result in admission of the representatives of New China to the UNO but on the contrary, would postpone their admission, that this act of the USSR was aimed to obstruct, if not even to prevent, the establishment of normal relations between New China and the western world and the strengthening of her international position, that the USSR thus wished to isolate New China in order to impose its will and hegemony upon her more easily, — these opinions were and have remained true and correct. But it is also true that all these statements do not exhaust the reply to the question why the Soviet Government decided to boycott the Security Council and the other bodies of the UNO.

A correct reply to this questions can be given only if the Soviet policy is viewed in its entirety and in the light of its deviation from the socialist principles which a socialist country should pursue, to a policy of hegemony, aggressiveness and subordination of other countries and peoples. The abandonment of a socialist foreign policy, whose aim and purpose is to maintain peace and international cooperation in the world, had of necessity to bring the Soviet leaders into a position where in determining their attitude and moves in their foreign policy they were no longer guided by socialist principles but by the direct and momentary interests of the USSR as a great power. Accordingly, the word "principled" on the lips of the Soviet representatives has become nothing but an empty phrase which is being exposed more and more as a falsehood and a fraud. Hence the inconsistency, lack of logic and charlatanism in the Soviet foreign policy, which is usually so characteristic of the policy of those countries which, under the cloak of the struggle for peace, endeavour to realize their non-peace-loving aims at the expense of other peoples and states. Only when viewing the Soviet foreign policy from this angle can we understand and explain such contradictory acts as the "principled" boycott of the UNO because of the presence of the Kuomintang delegate, on the one hand, and on the other the return of the Soviet representative to the Security Council, despite the fact that the representative of the Kuomintang clique is still there.

These facts must lead us to the conclusion that the USSR's attitude towards the UNO as such is also unprincipled and inconsistent. It cannot be otherwise since the Soviet policy in practice is not inspired by the interests of world peace and international cooperation. The above mentioned acts of the USSR can in fact only lead to undermining the authority and prestige of the UNO and their consequence is a further sharpening of contradictions in the world and the straining of tensions on an international plane. Progressive people in the world look upon the UNO as an instrument for the maintenance of peace in the world, which regrettably enough is being seriously threatened through the aggressive policy of the big powers. They resolutely condemn all machinations whose object is to transform the UNO from an instrument of peace into a weapon of the hegemonist policy of this or that big power.

K. BORICH

## Defenders of Soviet Bureaucratic Caste and the Most Important Decree of the Paris Commune

THE further development and extension of popular self-government is an essential element of socialist democracy, placed on the agenda by all the revolutionary moments in history. During the elections for the workers' councils in Yugoslavia, it has again become the object of hatred by the enemies of socialism who, in the present period of social development, are being joined by the revisionists from the Soviet Communist Party. With their "superstitious awe of the state", they are today, more openly than ever, propagating the theory that they need a state whose functions are steadily growing stronger (Stalin: "An Answer to the Comrades"), that is, that they require a state that is not withering away. In contrast to such concepts, the people of Yugoslavia have learned through their revolutionary struggle that the strengthening of the productive forces of society and constant extension of socialist democracy meaning more and more self-government, inevitably and lawfully cause socialist society to grow strong. That is why they were so enthusiastic while electing the workers' councils in the factories, mines and enterprises, knowing that this was just as important a step in the development of their own democracy as was the decisive blow to the bureaucratic caste in the USSR, which is in its own country an obstacle to the realization of one of the fundamental slogans of proletarian revolution: "the factories to the workers". Day to day experience of Yugoslavia has again shown that it is more powerful than all the various "prescriptions" for the building of socialism. With irresistible force, it is showing what free builders of a socialist society can do. Millions of free people in Yugoslavia, under the leadership of their Communist Party, did not allow themselves to be obstructed by the bureaucratic centralism holding sway in the Soviet Union, which was to have been forced on Yugoslavia, too. Because they did not want to bow down to the privileged bureaucratic caste living at the expense of Soviet society and introducing unequal relations and exploitation into the relations among socialist states, the Yugoslav communists were called "heroes". Then the USSR launched the unscrupulous and ruthless struggle against socialist Yugoslavia, a country which is today fighting so hard to realize the profound wishes of its working people to take a direct part in the management of their state.

Using the Paris Commune as an example, Marx and Engels pointed out how to fight "against what has so far been inevitable in all states, the transformation of the state and state organs from servants of society into its masters" (Engels). The infallible means which the Commune used to oppose this danger were elections and the power to recall employees in the administration, courts, etc., and a salary system according to which all office employees (both high and low in rank) received as much as other workers. Thereby, running after a career or profitable bureaucratic positions was put a stop to by these measures.

It would be interesting to take a look at the circumstances under which the Paris Commune was functioning, and at the conditions in which its principles were being realized. Regarding the work of the Government representing proletarian Paris, on that 71st day when Paris showed such great historic ini-

tiative and flexibility, which Marx admired sincerely, it can be seen clearly what can be done by an emancipated people and for what revolutionary aims they are capable of "storming the heavens". The men of the Paris Commune did not have their own proletarian party. They were led by Blanquists, by Prudhonists and others but nevertheless made such great revolutionary steps forward that they still astonish the world. Because of them Paris became more glorious than ever before. Referring to the Commune, Marx emphasized: "History knows no such example of heroism". The Soviet dogmatists in the service of the bureaucratic caste are today concealing the great historic initiative of the Paris Commune; they do not recognize its achievements, or, what is worse, they are crudely distorting them. They are systematically endeavoring to belittle the significance of some of the Commune's most important measures. The following example shows how they done that in relation to the implementation of the principle of direct participation of the workers in the management of production and the factories.

Two weeks after military operations were launched by the Versailles reaction (under the protective wing of Bismarck's Prussians) against proletarian Paris, the Commune adopted its most important decree, on April 16th. It ordered the organization of large scale industry and even small enterprises whose manufacturing owners fled Paris. The workers were to accomplish this by themselves. This was organization "which would be founded not only on the association of workers in each separate factory but was to unite all these associations into one big federation; in short, such an organization which, as Marx accurately put it in "Civil War", must finally lead to communism" (Engels).

On March 18th, 1891, Engels, in the introduction to the second edition of Marx's "Civil War in France" called the above-mentioned decree of April 16th "the most important decree of the Commune". However, the Soviet History of the New Century (Book II) edited by the academician Tarle and others, says: "In the period of strenuous struggle against Versailles, the Commune adopted the most important decree relative to the worker's question". (My italics) Why was it necessary for Tarle thus to conceal the Decree of April 16th, to give it mere passing mention as being "among the most important decrees relative to the worker's question"? Why falsification in regard to this decree especially? With what right does Tarle place the historic decree of April 16th in the same category with some other decrees which had to do with social, workers' questions, when it is a well-known fact that this was a profoundly revolutionary act of the Commune. Which decrees of the Commune were not related to "the workers' question" since we know the Paris Commune was the first proletarian revolution, a dictatorship of the proletariat, "the greatest example of the largest proletarian movement of the nineteenth century" (Lenin). Why do not Soviet history and its

writers allow that the Decree of April 16th, 1871, was the most important Decree of the Commune? Why do the Soviet jugglers of history whose dull quotations have killed free Marxist thought in the USSR and moulded it into stereotypes, why do they fear not only quoting Engels' appraisal of the Commune Decree of April 16th in their official history but avoid even giving a full account of the importance of that Decree as brought out so clearly by Engels? Is it that they have a light attitude toward historical facts? What, then according to Tarle and the Soviet historians, is actually the most important Commune Decree? And does it exist at all?

It is not a light attitude to historical facts but a definite necessity which forces Soviet historians to falsify history and the Soviet revisionists to conceal the opinions of Marx and Engels on the Paris Commune, and even the proclamation of these opinions as Utopian. This definite necessity arises from the defense of the privileged position of the Soviet bureaucratic, centralistic caste and the temporary transformation of the Soviet state into "force above society." It is certain true that in the USSR today there is an "attempt to create a new un-Marxist ideology on the basis of new, un-Marxist practice". But this question requires a profound analysis, while we here should only like to point out the following: the Paris Commune, at the height of the Versailles attack on Paris, during the tightest encirclement which can be imagined (after five months of siege and starvation of Paris, the Prussian held the most important forts in the town, Thiers was showering it with artillery fire and constantly charging the defenders, the Versailles supporters were freely roaming around Paris because the Commune was late in beginning to suppress its class enemies, the Paris Commune shattered the old state apparatus of the bourgeoisie and demonstrated how it should be replaced.

In order to defend its privileged position and justify the unequal relations of subordination and command which it introduced among socialist states and the working class movement, the Soviet bureaucratic caste is always saying that the process of the withering away of the state in the USSR is impossible because the Soviet Union is supposedly "encircled".


This saving fact of "encirclement" is also used by them in another way. But who was ever "encircled" more completely than the Commune of Paris? Nevertheless, the Commune, though overcome in the end, carried out revolutionary deeds of such magnitude, that the classics of Marxism express wonder and admiration. Is the encirclement of the USSR today such that in relation to the withering away of the state it is impossible to carry out measures brought out in their entirety by Marx and Engels in their analysis of the Paris Commune. One must really have the servile brain of a spineless satellite lackey to answer this question in the affirmative. The Paris Commune showed clearly and unequivocally, and this was confirmed by the classics of Marxism in their analysis of the Paris Commune which appraised the April 16th Decree as the most important one, that the withering away of the state must be linked up with the process of "organization of the economy on new lines".

Such an organization of the economy which "must lead to communism" is now being put into force in Yugoslavia. That means that our peoples have taken the first step along this great and long road, bearing witness to the existence of true socialism in Yugoslavia which is developing in the direction of increasing popular democracy.

The Yugoslav communists are pitting their lively, day to day experience against the concepts that only the bureaucratic apparatus is called upon to carry out state functions and that for this reason bureaucrats should receive much higher salaries than the workers, and that the functions of the state should not be turned over to the social organizations which have reserved for them the role of helpless advisors and observers. And this experience is based on the Marxist principles that the workers must take their turn at the management of production without receiving any pay, except that which they lose while not at their regular jobs, for their duties in the management councils. Again, practice in Yugoslavia confirms the correctness of the premises of the Marxist classics which pointed out that the process of withering away of the state should begin in the economy, through the development of free associations of direct producers who are to manage the production process. In Yugoslavia, five years after the end of the war, the management of the factories, mines, transportation system, agriculture, forestry and other enterprises is passing from the state administration into the hands of the workers, into the hands of the workers' councils and management councils and higher economic associations, in which three fourths of the members must be workers active in production, with only one third having the right to be elected to the management council for a second term, while no one can be a member of the management for more than two years in succession. This is the course our peoples have taken in the further development of creative initiative from below, in their struggle against conservative tendencies in socialism and the spineless bureaucratic "geniuses" who have climbed up on the backs of the Soviet people and are introducing unequal relations and exploitation among socialist states. This is the road by which the working class of Yugoslavia is again opening up the gates for the development of socialist society, that Soviet ideology brought to a state of stagnation, and Soviet practice to counter-revolution.

Z. PECHAR

## ENTRANCE FORBIDDEN



NO DISTURBANCES, GENTLEMEN, THE MESSRS. MALIK AND AUSTIN ARE DISCUSSING KOREA JUST NOW  
(Politika - Beograd)

# DRAFT CONVENTION ON CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND

DURING the course of the Second World War, the chiefs of the three main allied nations the anti-Hitlerite coalition, speaking in behalf of all the United Nations, announced the principle that the responsibility for provoking the war and the commission of war crimes shall not remain unpunished. It was emphasized that this decision did not have exclusively the character of a retribution, but that it would, at the same time, have an educational effect on the coming generations so that there would be no more bloodshed among peoples. It was pointed out that the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 had already provided for the fixing of responsibility for provoking of wars, but this was never put into force. Not only did German military leaders manage to avoid any punishment, but the scientist who planned and carried out chemical warfare, Ignacy Moszcicki, became President of the freed Polish Republic.

After the termination of the Second World War in 1945, the big powers signed an agreement in London on August 8th on the establishment of international military tribunals for the trial of those war criminals who prepared and began the war and whose crimes were not confined to one geographic area but affected either all of Europe or a large part of Asia. The agreement was signed by all the other allies, including Yugoslavia. That is how the Nurnberg and Tokyo international courts for war crimes came into being. Only the most prominent war criminals were brought before these courts. Their trials had the symbolic significance of judgment and conviction of Hitler's fascist machine and Japanese militarism. The decisions were handed down in Nurnberg on October 1st, 1946. On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed an unanimous decision to include the principles governing the Nurnberg and Tokyo trials and the decisions arrived at these trials into international law. They were to be reformulated and included in a general code on crimes against the peace and security of mankind. At the same time, the UN Commission for Progressive Development of International Law and its codification was asked to formulate these principles. This decision was considered as an expression of the solidarity of the allies in the last war and as a warning to those who would again attempt to provoke war.

Only a year later, in May-June 1947, there was a split among the allies during the work of the Commission. On the one hand, the Americans, British and French sought that the Nurnberg war crimes principles be formulated as narrowly and mildly as possible. Especially that, "while condemning the planning, preparation, inception or waging of aggressive war", these crimes be conceived of as actual material or overt acts, rejecting — in the name of democracy — the incrimination of all propaganda leading to war. They hid behind the idea that condemnation of war incitement propaganda could violate the right to free thought and expressions. On the other hand, the Soviet delegate, Professor Koretski, who insisted on a condemnation of war propaganda, submitted an amendment seeking that those principles be used as the basis not for general regulations of international law, but as a model for an international agreement or convention which would bind only those who signed

it. Academician Koretski emphasized that his formulation was theoretically and practically significant because state sovereignty would be destroyed if the principle were adopted that punishment for resorting to war as an instrument of national policy had a universal character. On the one hand, this would violate national sovereignty because a state would be restricted in its right to establish what is criminal behavior. On the other hand, it would be idle to talk about international punishment and international determination of crimes. On the contrary, it was necessary to allow states to display their maturity of will by subscribing to the proposed convention and that they themselves, within the scope of their own legislation, should lay down sanctions and assure the application of the obligations undertaken.

Two camps were therefore formed within the UN Commission on international law. One tried to carry out the tasks set before it by the General Assembly, that is, to draw up a code, but to introduce as few concrete elements as possible into that code. This was in consistency with the implementation of the policy of the Western Powers. The elimination of various concrete provisions was defended on the grounds that it is easier to secure general agreement on a narrow text. The other camp, however, was altogether against the adoption of a code, saying that the United Nations was not a super-state but an association of states and that their task consisted only in preparing a draft which would be submitted to the states for approval in the form of a convention.

In Geneva, during May-June, 1950, there was a special session of the Commission for International Law. On the agenda was the definitive draft form of the code. It had two parts — one was made up of formulation of the Nurnberg principles and the second part was an enumeration of war crimes. The Nurnberg principles were the following:

- 1) Anyone who commits one of the war crimes, either in a private or an official capacity, is liable to punishment;
- 2) A war crime can be committed by failing to use one's position for the prevention of war crimes;
- 3) The fact that someone is carrying out the orders of superiors or the law of his state in committing a crime, cannot be used a defense but may be considered as a mitigating circumstance;
- 4) it is the duty of states to adopt laws which will insure the punishment of war crimes;
- 5) it is the duty of each state to punish in its courts all war criminals who committed crimes on its territory;
- 6) these crimes are not considered political and are subject to the obligation of extradition;
- 7) if the state does not agree with the method of interpretation of the application of those principles, disputes will be settled by the International Court of Law (the Hague Court);

The crimes coming under this code are the following:

- 1) planning, preparing, beginning or waging aggressive warfare or a war violating international agreements or international declarations, or simply inducements or promises made by the statesmen of one country to another, for example, Hitler's promises to Poland and Czechoslovakia);

- 2) participation in joint preparations or plots for the commission of the above-mentioned acts;
- 3) concrete war crimes which violate the laws and customs of war against the civilian population or prisoners-of-war;
- 4) crimes against humanity (genocide);
- 5) invasion of foreign territory by armed bands;
- 6) incitement to civil war in another state;
- 7) organization of terroristic activities in other states;
- 8) manufacture, trading or possession of forbidden arms;
- 9) violation of military clauses in international agreements on peace and neutrality;
- 10) annexation of foreign territories.

Viewing this problem from an essentially correct angle namely that it is most important to prevent propaganda wars because these lead directly to war, and especially because the use of the most powerful weapon of warfare in the present epoch (atomic energy) has not been banned, the Soviet Union refused to even discuss this Code. But at the same time, it emphasized that if the code were adopted it would not be binding upon the Soviet Union because it does not recognize the right of any other state to impose upon it any laws whatsoever. It is the competence of national sovereignty alone to decide whether there is a war crime or not, whether there is aggression or not. If one is taking as a point of departure some international definition of aggression and that the International Court of Law should decide whether there has been aggression or not in case of a dispute between states, then this in itself is a threat to national sovereignty.

The Korean question must be linked up directly and in principle with the above attitude of the Soviet Union. The Security Council decided that North Korea was the aggressor in that situation, although it did not give North Korea a hearing beforehand. At the same time an appeal was sent to the Soviet Union, as the power having influence over the proclaimed aggressor, to use its influence to bring the hostilities to a close. The Soviet Union answered that it did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea. A few weeks later, the Moscow "Pravda" and "Izvestia" published an article entitled "Ignoramuses in International Law". The article defended the idea that there can be no talk at all of any kind of aggression by anyone in the conflict between North and South Korea because they are two parts of one and the same state. Accordingly, there is no fundamental condition present for aggression. Aggression can only be carried out by one state against another, and not toward another part of itself. Because there is no aggressor among the Koreans, the aggressors are those who have come in from outside to interfere in the conflict, concretely, the USA. Therefore, no definition of aggressor can justify the intervention of the UNO nor can any interpretation of such a definition by the UN be binding upon the Soviet Union. The reason for that is that any kind of outside interpretation whatsoever of the concept of aggression would violate the freedom of the national policy of a state, which would mean anticipating the Geneva Convention to the effect that some sort of code against crimes against peace should be imposed on states.

Such a point of view is, without a doubt, in disharmony with the original, joint and unanimous decision of the UN Assembly which all member states voted for in 1946 including the Soviet Union, which accompanied its agreement with much loud talk about the prevention of a future war and war crimes. However, the situation has now changed, the conflict has sharpened. The big powers are asking for a free

hand for their future policies. This is also being sought by the Soviet Union. That is way, in its big peace offensive, it is rejecting any international regulation which might be an obstacle to its policy.

In the present situation, the tendency of Soviet diplomacy is to put the blame on others. While Western diplomacy is riding along on the atomic bomb and looking for a formal aggressor on whom it could lay the blame according to international law, the USSR protests against the attempt to consider the formal aggressor as a war criminal and is seeking to have the country which first uses the atom bomb proclaimed as the main war criminal. This also demonstrates the present position of international law, which always depends directly on political conceptions. That is why everyone is attempting in his own way to do what corresponds to his own temporary interests and to implement a policy according to rules he lays down himself.

But it must not be forgotten that there is the consciousness of the broad masses of people to be taken into account. Yugoslavia is in principle for the adoption of any international regulation contributing to international cooperation and peace in the world. We are not Utopians who believe that legal regulations can prevent the world from going to war, but we are convinced that the masses throughout the world are formulating their own regulations against war and that these are becoming a component part of their consciousness which is daily becoming a stronger and stronger defense against warmongering attempts coming from both sides.

R. M. B.



N. MARTINOSKI: A PEASANT WOMAN  
FROM MACEDONIA



## BELGIAN COMINFORMISTS FEAR SPREAD OF "TITOISMS"

AN article entitled "struggle against Tito's Clique" appeared in the July issue of the magazine "Communism", published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium. As to form, this article looks like some kind of bureaucratic circular. There is no serious analysis of the facts.


The article begins with the following statement by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Belgium, Edgar Lalman, made in a report on the danger from "Titoist deviations":

"It was with the greatest interest that we took note (italics mine, M. G.) of articles published in the communist press on the activities being developed by the Titoists. But we were not right in thinking that all this does not concern us directly, that there are no Titoist activities in Belgium. The Yugoslav Legation in Brussels is flooding the country with its infamous literature and attempting to get in touch with certain Party members".

After citing this statement, the author of the article remarks that Belgian reactionaries and their allies are systematically using "Titoist slanders" to introduce confusion into the ranks of the communists and undermine the faith of the workers in the USSR. He says:

"It is therefore important to attach much more significance to the work of the Tito's clique than we have been doing so far".

As a "Point of departure", the article presents the thesis that the struggle against the "Tito's clique" is not some kind of an "internal struggle among communists" but a fundamental aspect (sic! of the struggle of the democratic camp as a whole against the warmongers, against American imperialism. And then he loftily goes on to recall the first Commandment: "in order to grasp all this, it is necessary to remember one fundamental, essential element which must never be lost sight of, and that is the leading role of the USSR in the struggle against the warmongers". After that, come other Cominform "Commandments" and along with them the already familiar slanders about those who are "prolonging the course



Petar LUBARDA: VILLAGE OF BRAYICHI (in oil)

of Trotzkyism", who are "in the service of the American imperialists", who have "turned Yugoslavia into an American colony", "into a police state or even a state of the fascist type", etc., etc.

No two ways about it, the Belgian Cominformists are really afraid of the "activities being carried on by the Titoists". On the one hand, it is clear that the writer of the article can see that, in the ranks of the Belgian communists, there is an increasing struggle for freedom of action and independence for the Belgian CP as well as for equal relations among communist parties. On the other hand, he tries to conceal that by ascribing all these things to the supposed underground activities of the Yugoslav Legation in Belgium.

How similar all this is to the writing of the reactionary press during the period when the forces of the People's Front in France were growing and enthusiastic, that is, in 1934 and 1935. This press tried everything to convince the French public that answer of the French people to the ascendancy of fascism in Germany and to the attempts of the Cagoulards and the Fiery Cross and other fascist organizations were the result of "growing activity" of the Soviet Embassy in Paris.

And just as no one in the progressive French circles of the time believed such an absurd claim, there is no honest person in Belgium today who would give serious attention to the arguments put forward by the General Secretary of the Belgian Communist Party. Secondly, since when

do communists in countries where they pretend to actual leadership of the working masses fear the various kinds of propaganda activities of embassies and legations? Serious communist movements and parties did not fear the embassies and legations even then when the German fascists, without sparing expenses, were using all their might to destroy them and bring the fifth column into power.

In this case, the Belgian communists are simply showing how entangled they became in their own network of lies — a fate which caught up with their colleagues in other countries, too. Or perhaps, as disciples of Soviet bureaucracy, they have begun to believe in the "omnipotence" of embassies and legations. They can see that omnipotence in the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites where it is based on the method of spreading "socialism" with bayonets and through the infiltration of hundreds and thousands of secret Soviet agents in the key posts of the state apparatus and communist parties of those countries.

Following the old Cominform recipe, we see the struggle of the Belgian communists of the independence of their party and equality of communist parties being described as the work of secret agents who must be done away with. Does not all this once again show the Soviet-bureaucratic sources of the Cominform discussions in articles published by the Belgian Communist Party's magazine "Communism".

M. G.

## The Latest Style in Fascist-Cominform Circles

THE Italian Communist Party paper, "Paese", the Democratic-Christian "Popolo" and the fascist "Tempo" recently gave front page space to a story about the escape of a certain Felice Farini from "a prison camp" in Yugoslavia, where he had supposedly been condemned to forced labor for life. According to these newspapers, he succeeded in arranging his "escape" with the aid of a former SS man, also a prisoner of war. They made their flight in a small boat which was caught in a storm at sea. Farini's colleague lost his life.

Describing this "heroic feat" of his, Farini told newspapermen, which was most important for the Italian papers, that there were still many Italian prisoners of war in Yugoslavia, that they are leading a very hard life, etc., etc.

The Italian radio broadcast three programs and one interview with this Cominform and fascist hero.

However, as it turned out, the directors did not anticipate all the scenes in this play, least of all its epilogue. They did not count on the fact that 2 members of the real Felice Farini's family were still alive in Italy. (He had fallen in Albania, as a member of the Italian Expeditionary Corps.) The parents of the deceased, upon hearing the news, rushed to welcome and embrace their "resurrected" son who had succeeded in returning from the "Yugoslav hell". And there the plot thickened. Upon arriving in Rome, the relatives sought "their" Felice who, according to the Italian press, was resting in a hospital after his heroic endeavor. There in the hospital ward, the family of the real Felice Farini suffered a great disappointment. This Cominform hero was

not, nor could he have been, the deceased Felice Farini. It ensued that this Robinson Crusoe No. 2 of the Cominform and fascist "Pease", "Tempo" and other Italian papers had never even laid eyes on Yugoslavia, or crossed the Adriatic in a rowboat, or swam a record-breaking 60 hours in the Adriatic to get to Italy. It turned out that he had simply told the story against Yugoslavia for the benefit of the Cominform and fascist papers because, as he put it himself, "it was fashionable these days.

R. ST.

AN OTHERWISE DISCIPLINED MEMBER of the Cominform propaganda apparatus who sometimes nevertheless violates discipline got some small satisfaction a few days ago.

We are referring to Radio Budapest, a member of that apparatus which from time to time allows itself a little initiative. The last case of such initiative was noted on July 9th, when the ambitious program men of that radio-station, wishing to prove themselves somewhat better than the common translators of Russian texts, made up and inserted in their daily program the sensational news that "Tito had issued orders for the mobilization of volunteers for Korea." The news was so stupid that no other Cominform radio station bothered to pick it up. Confused by this, Radio Budapest itself didn't dare repeat it in later broadcasts. It again began sticking to its old rule: broadcast only what you get from the Soviet Union.

But then something happened that encouraged Radio Budapest. Namely, a few days before that

news about the volunteers for Korea, on July 4th, it broadcast, again on its own initiative, a similarly stupid communique to the effect that an SS paratrooper Skorцени was currently in Yugoslavia. And that communique also fell through, like the one about the volunteers. However, a month later, the Cominform's face was red because of the news about von Kleist which it had publicized. It had broadcast that von Kleist was brewing war plans in Yugoslavia when it was ascertained that this former Hitlerite general was — in the Soviet Union. This embarrassing situation has to be covered up as quickly as possible. They had to keep to the story that Yugoslavia was hiring former Hitlerites but now they had to find somebody who was not in the Soviet Union. Someone remembered the Radio Budapest news about Skorцени. Now all the Cominform papers and stations are repeating the old communique from Radio Budapest, with the same words, that Skorцени had arrived in Yugoslavia "a few days ago." The words "a few days ago" in the original news referred to the beginning of July whereas in its new edition that would have meant the beginning of August, but who is the Cominform to look to such trifling matters!

So Radio Budapest can draw some measure of satisfaction from this. One of its errors has been forgiven. Besides, this case awakens hope that the same might happen with that other unfortunate, made-up story. Because (who knows!) maybe the Cominform will soon again be in need of getting out of some new uncomfortable situation. Then, perhaps, the other unsuccessful story by Radio Budapest will be taken out of the files, and all Cominform propaganda organs which had appraised it as stupid a month ago will be ordered to repeat: "Volunteers for Korea are being mobilized in Yugoslavia".



## Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj on Yugoslavia's Attitude Toward the Korean War

MINISTER of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj, answering questions asked by the editorial board of »Borba« (Struggle) organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, said the following about the stand of Yugoslavia in relation to the war in Korea —

“The attitude of Yugoslavia toward the war in Korea is determined by the following factors —

1. Yugoslavia is in principle and in practice for the right of every people to self-determination and against interference in the internal affairs of independent states. Taking that as a point of departure Yugoslavia, naturally, fosters sympathies toward the natural and historically ripe aspirations of Asiatic peoples to be free and independent. That is why socialist Yugoslavia gives moral and political support to suppressed peoples, if their struggle is in fact leading towards actual liberation and real independence. This also applies to the Korean people. It is a known fact that Yugoslavia has, in its international political activities, always supported the right of the Korean people to unification, to independence and to elect their own government and chose a way of life without any interference from foreign powers. Unfortunately, this did not come to pass in Korea. This country became the object of struggle between foreign interests, struggle for domination in the world.

2. It is altogether clear that under such conditions the Korean problem is a part of the general problem of peace in the world, which it is impossible to regard separately. Those who are responsible for the war in Korea must have known that such a war would be a profound threat to world peace, incite the forces of aggression, set into motion the war machines of the big powers and make international contradictions even worse. And that is what happened. The fact that they have, despite that, taken this course anyway unequivocally confirms that they do not care much about world peace, and even less about the freedom, independence and unification of the Korean people but only about taking advantage of the just struggle of the Korean people for the exten-

sion of their hegemony. It is clear to everyone today that the Korean war is a hard blow to the cause of peace in the world, precisely because it serves foreign hegemonistic interests.

3. It is a generally known fact that there is in Korea a mass liberation and democratic movement which expresses the aspirations and will of the Korean people in the struggle for independence and unification and for democratic rights. However, the people's hope of liberation are here, like in many other parts of the world, being misused for the ends of a foreign hegemonistic policy which is hiding behind false tales about help to the Korean people in their fight for independence. And it is precisely because of that that the armed actions by the North Korean Government are not leading to true liberation of the Korean people, although they are being exposed to horrible sufferings and their country being devastated by war. It is obvious that the Korean people, now and under these concrete conditions, should seek other ways of struggle for their independence and unification, not permitting their fight to be turned into an instrument of alien hegemonistic policy. Only in that way would they render impossible foreign intervention in Korea and new threats to world peace. On the contrary, the Korean people have been cast out on a road which, as Marshal Tito said, does not lead to their independence, and the sacrifices they are making today are not in their own interest. What is more, the war in Korea not only threatens world peace but endangers even those attainments which the Korean people have already won. Once more, it has been confirmed that of the leadership of a liberation movement, whether consciously or unconsciously, becomes an instrument of foreign, hegemonistic tendencies, it is inevitable that it will do harm to its people and the movement it is leading. Could it be said now that the Korean people are any closer to real independence and unification than they were before the present war? No, certainly not. But those who want to fight wars of conquest are taking advantage of the Korean war, and will continue doing so, for further undermining of peace and still more rapid preparations for war. And circles such as these exist both in the West and in the East, despite the loud fanfare of propaganda about loving peace.

4. The peoples of Yugoslavia cannot help comparing events in Korea with the fact that the furiously aggressive campaign being carried on ceaselessly against socialist Yugoslavia by the Cominform governments, headed by the USSR, is now in its third year. And this is so

because, the working people of Yugoslavia are defending their right to decide their own affairs on their own soil. This aggressive policy toward socialist Yugoslavia is the most convincing argument about the real essence of the policy of its organizers in other parts of the world. There can be no doubt that those who are pursuing an aggressive, hegemonistic and anti-socialist policy against socialist Yugoslavia cannot be pursuing a different policy in other parts of the world, that is, a peaceful, democratic, socialistic policy of true equality and fraternity among all peoples. The policy of the top Cominform circles has already for a long time been incommensurate with the interests of human progress and that is why it is doing harm to all those progressive and liberation movements which become its instrument. All their clamor about their fidelity to peace and the aggressiveness of others will not be able to conceal their share of the responsibility for the war in Korea and for the threat to peace in the world in general.

5. It is, therefore, obvious, that the people of Yugoslavia cannot support such a policy directed against the interests of world peace and which can only bring harm and misfortune to the Korean people. In addition, they cannot lose sight of the fact that the present war in Korea is, in the final analysis, a consequence of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea and actual division of that country into two spheres of interests. The Yugoslav Government took a stand in accordance with these facts at the Security Council. As soon as the war began in Korea, the Yugoslav Delegation sought for an immediate end of hostilities, to have both sides heard and to find a form of mediation which would prevent an extension of hostilities and eliminate the danger of their spreading. However, it was not successful in these endeavors. The Yugoslav Government nevertheless believes that it will best serve the cause of peace if it adheres strictly to its policy, consistently refusing to offer support to anyone's hegemonistic tendencies in Korea and of trying to find a way to limit and put a rapid end to the Korea War. It is, of course, self-evident that the Yugoslav Government will continue to give moral and political support to the Korean people in their struggle for unification and real independence. This stand will also guide our delegation at the coming session of the UN, where it will try to contribute toward the most rapid possible solution of this question for the maintenance of peace in the world, and in the interests of the Korean people themselves.